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The confused state of most state corporate merger statutes allows many
intellectual property licenses to find their way into unintended hands by
way of corporate merger, in spite of non-assignment clauses. Clearly a
detriment to licensors, corporate licensees too should be wary of depending
upon the merger statute; a court ruling may not go their way. The states
must clean up their collective act and bring some much needed certainty to
a highly unpredictable intersection of corporate and intellectual property
law.

INTRODUCTION
¶1

Creators of original works most often protected by copyright, patent, and trademark, allow others to

use them by way of licensing agreements. Many of these licenses contain clauses prohibiting the assignment
of the license to others without the permission of the licensor. However, inconsistency among the states has
fostered continuing confusion regarding the efficacy of such clauses when confronted with the merger of
parties. Even within one jurisdiction, sparse and ambiguous rulings often result in inconsistency based on the
type of merger involved: forward mergers may constitute an impermissible assignment, while reverse mergers
do not. Such uncertainty is conducive neither to sound business decisions nor to the secure licensing of
rights; the states should move, as some already have, toward clarifying their merger statutes.

BACKGROUND
¶2

Intellectual property rights, which initially lie with the creator of an original work, may be licensed to

others by contract. Publishers pay authors for the right to distribute the authors’ works; similarly, businesses
pay inventors for the right to manufacture and sell products based on their inventions. These rights are
granted by way of a license on the original work in question.2
¶3

A license is a contract whereby the holder of intellectual property rights grants permission for another

party to make use of the work. In exchange, the licensed party will furnish the rights holder with some
consideration or royalty, usually either a fee or a per unit rate, or some combination thereof.3
¶4

The licensee an inventor chooses to make use of his original work is often exceedingly important to a

licensing arrangement. Trade and service mark licensors, for example, will be very careful about who may be
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allowed to offer goods and services to the public under the aegis of their mark; poor quality goods or services
will damage the value of a mark, so a mark holder will want to be certain to retain power to vet licensees.
Often this is accomplished by means of a non-assignment provision in the license agreement, forbidding the
transfer of the license. However, unless the provision expressly prohibits the license surviving a merger, a
company which acquires a licensee via a merger may also succeed to the license agreement without the
permission of the licensor.4

STATE MERGER STATUTES
¶5

While not an entirely settled question, assignment of patent and copyright licenses is generally held to

be matter of Federal common law.5 However, whether a merger constitutes an assignment remains a matter
of state law.6 The language of state merger statutes therefore determines the effect of mergers with respect to
assignment of licenses and the states have taken various approaches to the problem of assignment via merger.
¶6

While a number of states have adopted parts of the ABA Model Business Corporation Act (the

“Model Act”) at various times, the “effect of merger” provision (currently §11.07) language has changed over
the years. In 1969, it stated that following a merger, the survivor
shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges, immunities,
and franchises . . . of each of the merging or consolidating corporations …
and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to each of the
corporations so merged . . . shall be taken and deemed to be transferred to
and vested in such single corporation without further act or deed.7
¶7

Alabama and Ohio, for example, have adopted this language.8

¶8

The approach of the California legislature is not far removed from that of the 1969 Model Act

language. The California statute reads: “the surviving corporation shall succeed, without other transfer, to all
the rights and property of each of the disappearing corporations.”9
¶9

In 1984, the Model Act was revised, and the new provision employed substantially different

language: “all property owned by, and every contract right possessed by, each corporation or other entity that
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merges into the survivor is vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment . . . .”10 The Delaware
statute employs some of this latter language.11
¶10

The official comment to Model Act §11.07 includes the following note: “A merger is not a

conveyance, transfer, or assignment. It does not give rise to a claim that a contract with a party to the merger
in effect on the grounds of non-assignability, unless the contract specifically provides that it does not survive
a merger.”12
¶11

In order to ensure the enforceability of this proviso, certain states have modified their statutory

language. Colorado’s statute states that following a merger the assets of the constituent corporations are
“transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation.”13 This language was formerly employed by the Ohio
statute, and was interpreted contrary to the official comment proviso, as will be discussed below. To prevent
this problem, Colorado has enacted a further provision explicitly providing that “a merger does not constitute
a conveyance, transfer, or assignment.”14
¶12

Similarly, until 1987, the Texas statute was nearly identical; the assets of constituent corporations

were “deemed to be transferred to and vested in” the survivor.15 For the same reasons as Colorado, Texas
amended its previous statute.16 The statute now provides that the assets of constituent corporations are
“deemed to be, and without any transfer or assignment having occurred, vested in” the surviving
corporation.17 A few states have thus taken steps to prevent the confusion that might arise following a
merger. Most effectively, states such as Colorado and Texas have amended their state statutes to expressly
dictate that a merger does not constitute the assignment of a license.

FORMS OF MERGER
¶13

There are two common forms of merger, usually referred to as “forward” or “direct” mergers and

“reverse triangular” or “reverse subsidiary” mergers. The form employed in a given transaction can have a
serious impact on the outcome in terms the transfer of license agreements.18
¶14

In a forward merger, an acquired company ceases to exist as it is subsumed by the acquiring company

or its subsidiary, which survives the merger. The surviving company then succeeds, by operation of law, to
the assets and liabilities of the subsumed corporation.19
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¶15

By contrast, in a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring corporation sets up a subsidiary corporation.

This subsidiary is then merged into the target company, which survives the merger, but which has traded its
own stock for that of the subsumed subsidiary, so that the acquiring company now holds the target, which
retains its assets, as a wholly-owned subsidiary.20
¶16

Because the target company survives the merger, it has been assumed that such a merger does not fall

prey to the uncertainty attending forward mergers with respect to assignments. Indeed, in moving to amend
its merger statute, the Texas legislature acted on the belief that reverse mergers were proof against questions
of assignment, and therefore it was merely closing a loophole where one type of merger was open to contest
but the other was not.21

CASE LAW
¶17

The case law22 touching on this question is particularly confusing, not least because the courts so

often have deviated from what would appear to be an intuitive reading of the statutory language. The
revisions to the Model Act do not appear to have solved the problem; the “vested in” language contained in
the 1984 Model Act has been repeatedly construed as denoting an assignment or transfer of contract rights
from the constituent companies to the surviving company.
¶18

As long ago as 1939, in Koppers Coal & Transport Co. v. United States,23 the Third Circuit

confronted the Delaware statute, which then, as now, provided that when the merger is effected, “the separate
existence of all the constituent corporations . . . shall cease” and that property “belonging to each [constituent
corporation] shall be vested in the corporation resulting from or surviving” the merger.24 Faced with an
argument that constituent corporations do not cease to exist, but rather live on within the surviving
corporation, the court dismissed it as “metaphysical” and easily dispelled by the “vested in” language.25 “In
short, the underlying property of the constituent corporations is transferred to the resultant corporation upon
the carrying out of the . . . merger . . . .”26
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¶19

Similar language is included in the Alabama “effect of merger” provision, derived from the Model

Act.27 The Alabama statute explicitly states that “[w]hen a merger takes effect . . . [e]very other corporation
party to the merger merges into the surviving corporation and the separate existence of every corporation
except the surviving corporation ceases.”28 Nonetheless, in 1995 the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
accepted just such a “metaphysical” argument in International Paper Co. v. Broadhead.29 Though the new
language had been adopted in the meantime, the court confirmed the continued validity of a 1974 ruling by
the Alabama Supreme Court, which held that “[i]t is well-settled that the merger of two corporations does not
end the existence of either, rather the existence of both continues under the merged status.”30 Therefore, since
neither entity has ceased existence, no transfer or assignment is necessary; the contracting party continues to
exist and to perform under the agreement.31
¶20

Neither of these cases dealt specifically with licenses. Koppers related to the transfer of stock shares,

and International Paper to the survival of tax privileges. However, the principles on which both cases were
decided have heavily influenced license-related cases.

PPG Industries: Merger as Transfer
¶21

In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,32 the Sixth Circuit addressed the transfer, via

merger, of a patent license. In spite of a clause in the license forbidding assignment, the licensee merged into
another corporation, a competitor of the licensor.33 This surviving corporation then claimed it had not
received the license via assignment, but rather had succeeded to them by virtue of the merger.34 The court
noted that the chief precedent cited by scholars on this matter was Hartford-Empire Co. v. Demuth Glass
Works, Inc.,35 which dealt with licenses which were explicitly assignable.36 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the conclusion reached in Hartford-Empire, that the licenses were “conveyed” under New York
law to the survivor, owed to their explicit assignability, and not to “any general principle that such licenses
pass to the resultant corporation where there is a merger.”37
¶22

Though declining to apply the Hartford-Empire precedent, the Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that

the licenses in PPG Industries were in fact transferred to the surviving corporation in violation of the nonassignment clause. Citing the Third Circuit ruling in Koppers, the PPG Industries court based its judgment
27
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on an interpretation of the Ohio “effect of merger” statute.38 The Ohio statute at the time was based on the
1969 Model Act and stated that all property of constituent corporations would “deemed to be [t]ransferred to
and vested in the surviving or new corporation.”39 The Delaware statute construed by the Third Circuit in
Koppers, by contrast, employs the language later adopted by the 1984 Model Act40, to wit, the property
“belonging to each [constituent corporation] shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from
such merger.”41 Nonetheless, the PPG Industries court, based on the language used by the Koppers court –
“the underlying property of the constituent corporations is transferred to the resultant corporation”42 – deemed
the Ohio statute to be semantically equivalent to the Delaware statute, and therefore the merger to have
violated the non-assignment clause: “A transfer is no less a transfer because it takes place by operation of law
rather than by a particular act of the parties.”43
¶23

This rationale has not been universally accepted. The Texas legislature found it so disturbing that

Texas legislators specifically cited it as a result the new statutory language was designed to prevent.44

Trubowitch: The Balance of Interest Test
¶24

Courts, too, disapproved of the PPG Industries ruling.
45

Traynor’s finding in Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co.

Citing California Supreme Court Justice

that "if an assignment results merely from a

change in the legal form of ownership of a business, its validity depends upon whether it affects the interests
of the parties protected by the non-assignability of the contract,"46 in Syenergy Methods v. Kelly Energy
Systems, Inc, the Rhode Island Federal District Court chose to qualify the PPG Industries decision.47
¶25

Based on the fact that, in this particular case, the court could discern “no change in the protected

interests of the parties” as a result of the merger, the Syenergy Methods court chose to accept that, while the
merger might be seen in light of PPG Industries as effecting a transfer, it was not a transfer in violation of the
non-assignment clauses:48 “Defendants cannot be permitted to dispute the terms of a legitimate agreement
when no substantial basis exists for such a dispute.”49
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¶26

However, the rationale adopted in Trubowitch received short shrift in Council of Better Business

Bureaus Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, Inc.,50 a trademark license case. Though, as in Syenergy, there was no
discernable prejudice to the rights of either party following the merger – both parties to the merger held
licenses for the same trademark – the court, citing PPG Industries, refused to budge from a strict reading of
the “explicit language” of the non-assignment clause.51
¶27

The Trubowitch doctrine turns up again in SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp.52 However, in this

case the federal court determined that the balance of interest test was unnecessary.53 Considering a software
license dispute, the facts of which were remarkably similar to those in PPG Industries (a licensee merged
with a competitor of the licensor; the license contained a non-assignment clause) the court, citing Trubowitch,
held that “California courts have consistently recognized that an assignment or transfer of rights does occur
through a change in the legal form of ownership of a business.”54 Citing Koppers, the court endorsed the
proposition that “a transfer of rights is no less a transfer because it occurs by operation of law in a merger.”55
Despite taking explicit note of Justice Traynor’s Trubowitch principle – that the validity of an assignment
depends on its effect on the interest of the parties – the SQL Solutions court concludes that copyright licenses
are not assignable as a matter of Federal law, and so the transfer, though it might otherwise survive an
analysis under the Trubowitch test, is forbidden under Federal law.56

The Reverse Triangular Merger Problem
¶28

The SQL Solutions decision is notable for another reason. Excepting Hartford-Empire, for which the

record is unclear,57 all of the cases previously discussed involved forward mergers. SQL Solutions involves a
reverse triangular merger.58
¶29

With respect to the Hartford-Empire decision, the PPG Industries opinion comments that “[i]t is also

noteworthy that the surviving corporation following the merger in Hartford-Empire was the original licensee,
whereas in the present case the original licensee was merged into [the survivor].”59 Furthermore, the Texas
50
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legislature, in amending the Texas statute in 1987, expressed the opinion that “a merger may now be effected
without raising the issue [of assignment by merger] by means of a "reverse triangular merger."60 However,
the SQL Solutions decision casts doubt on the certainty of this conclusion. Although the court was
undoubtedly aware of PPG Industries,61 it took no interest in the mechanics of the merger, concluding that
under established California doctrine, an assignment occurs through a change in the legal form of ownership
of a business.62 Evidently, a reverse triangular merger qualifies as a “change in the legal form of ownership,”
under the doctrine of Trubowitch.

TXO Production: The Efficacy of the Texas Statute
¶30

By deviating from the Model Act language, Texas has had better luck than many other states in

drafting a statute sufficiently lucid on this point to make deviation by its courts practically impossible. Its
1987 revision was put to the test in 1999 in TXO Production Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc.63 Here, the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals overturned a ruling by the trial court, which held that a nonassignable license to use
proprietary data was improperly transferred by operation of a merger.64
¶31

On appeal, the court considered the arguments favoring the precedent of PPG Industries but

dismissed them on several grounds.65 First, the court held that PPG Industries is distinguishable from TXO
Production because the former case involved a merger between unrelated entities, while the latter was
between a parent and subsidiary, and therefore merely a change of form.66 Texas therefore seems not
subscribe to Judge Traynor’s assertion that a change in the legal form of ownership of a corporation is
sufficient to effect a transfer.
¶32

Second, the court noted that Texas legislators, in promulgating the 1987 statute revision, had

expressly named the ruling in PPG Industries as a result they were attempting to prevent.67 Third, the court
observed that PPG Industries involved a patent license, and was based therefore in part on “a strong public
policy against the implied assignment of patent licenses.”68 TXO Production, by contrast, involved a license
to use data; the licensor attempted to argue that the data constituted a trade secret, and might therefore be
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analogous to a patent license, but failed to convince the court.69 This third contention by the court seems
distinctly questionable. While the PPG Industries opinion does make mention of this federal policy, it notes
that the district court had concluded that it was not germane to the case, since it needed first to determine, via
state law, whether there had been a transfer.70 There is nothing to suggest that the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals took issue with this ruling by the trial court; its opinion appears to have been based on this
determination, focusing on the mechanics of the merger under state law.
¶33

Even so, the final distinction is the most significant. The court concluded that the Texas, Ohio, and

Delaware statutes, being all derived in some measure from the Model Act,71 are sufficiently similar to be
interchangeable.72 Explicitly rejecting the conclusion reached in PPG Industries, it instead chose to
reinterpret all three statutes, reading them - without explicit textual analysis - to result in the surviving
corporation’s succession to the rights of the constituent corporations without a prohibited transfer.73

CONCLUSION
¶34

To feel secure in their rights, licensors must be able to make an accurate assessment of who may

ultimately come into possession of the licenses they grant. Careful drafting of license agreements – the
inclusion of an explicit bar to mergers or, alternatively, explicit permission, in non-assignment clauses – is
still the best way to prevent surprises like the sort seen above. Many existing licenses, however, and no doubt
many yet to come, do not contain clauses addressing this point. It would behoove the states to make their
merger statutes as pellucid as possible to avoid these problems.
¶35

While direct textual analysis of the Texas statute is absent from the opinion in TXO Production,

Texas’s adoption of a provision explicitly barring mergers from being interpreted as assignments has clearly
shown the benefits to be gained by enactment of much-needed legislative guidance. California’s more
ambiguous language seems to have been almost entirely ignored by the courts, as evidenced by the opinion in
SQL Solutions. Worst of all, the language of the current Model Act, as embodied in Delaware’s statute, has
been the most inconsistently interpreted of all.
¶36

The explicit statement included in the official comment to the Model Act is obviously not effective

unless, as Texas has done, it is included within the body of the statute. Other states, especially those
employing the “vested in” language of the current Model Act, and most especially Delaware and New York,
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the main centers of American corporate law and practice, must seriously consider following Texas and
adopting the comment language into the text of their statutes.
¶37

These states need not adopt Texas’s stance on assignment. It will suffice if they dictate the

alternative: that a merger is an assignment. However, the situation can only be improved by shedding some
legislative light on this very murky corner of jurisprudence where fundamental principles of intellectual
property protection merge with increasingly important trends in corporate law.

